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a b s t r a c t
Labor unemployment insurance reduces unemployment concerns. We argue that these
benefits moderate incentives to smooth earnings to reduce employees’ concerns about
unemployment risk. Using exogenous variations in unemployment insurance benefits,
we find evidence consistent with this argument. We also find that the link between unem-
ployment insurance benefits and income smoothing is stronger when there is higher
unemployment risk and when the firm is likely to employ more low-wage workers, who
find unemployment insurance benefits especially useful. Our paper contributes to the lit-
erature by showing that public policy decisions such as unemployment insurance have sig-
nificant, albeit probably unintended, externalities on corporate financial reporting.
 2019 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
In this paper, we examine how the public policy decision to provide unemployment insurance benefits affects firms’
income smoothing behavior. Unemployment imposes significant economic, physiological, and psychological costs on work-
ers (e.g., Diamond, 1982; Harris and Holmstrom, 1982; Lazear, 2003; Mortensen, 1986;Wanberg, 2012). All states in the Uni-
ted States as well as many countries around the world have implemented unemployment benefits programs to lessen these
burdens. Workers are likely to be less concerned about unemployment if they are provided with relief measures, such as
unemployment insurance (UI) benefits, in the event that they are laid off.
As volatile earnings are perceived as a signal of risk, firms prefer to report smooth income so that they appear less risky
(Graham et al., 2005). A large body of empirical literature finds evidence of income smoothing behavior, in which firms cre-
ate precautionary reserves during periods of strong performance and then release them during poor performance periods
(e.g., see Hall, 1993; Land and Lang, 2002; Lang et al., 2006; Leuz et al., 2003; Tucker and Zarowin, 2006). Most of the prior
theories and empirical evidence that link labor conditions to financial reporting choices typically focus on how senior exec-
utives’ employment considerations (e.g., bonus contracts and equity incentives) affect reporting choices (e.g., Healy, 1985;
Fischer and Verrecchia, 2000; Kirschenheiter and Melumad, 2002; Goldman and Slezak, 2006). While changes in labor poli-
cies such as UI benefits have a direct impact on a broader swath of the labor population, the literature that investigates how
these policies influence corporate financial reporting choices is still emerging (Dou et al., 2016; Ji and Tan, 2016).
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We argue that concerns about unemployment risk could induce income smoothing and that UI benefits therefore affect
firms’ income smoothing behavior. It is well-established in the labor economics literature that unemployment risk is costly
to firms because employees who are concerned about the adverse effects of unemployment require firms to provide a wage
premium (i.e., a compensating wage differential) for this risk exposure. The outcome is an increase in the firm’s compensa-
tion expenses (Abowd and Ashenfelter, 1981; Li, 1986). This compensating wage differential is not trivial. For example,
Agrawal and Matsa (2013) conservatively estimate that in the absence of UI benefits, the cost of compensating wage differ-
entials can be over 150 basis points of firm value for a BBB-rated firm. We therefore contend that managers have incentives
to engage in income smoothing to make their firms appear less risky to current and prospective employees. This appearance,
in turn, reduces compensating wage differentials and other related costs (e.g., productivity losses due to employees’ anxiety
over the prospect of unemployment). If, as conjectured, unemployment concerns induce income smoothing behavior, then
unemployment benefits, which diminish such concerns, should attenuate income smoothing. We empirically examine this
issue by following Agrawal and Matsa (2013) and using exogenous inter-state cross-sectional and intra-state time-series
variations in UI benefits in the United States. Following prior literature, we capture income smoothing in terms of the neg-
ative correlation between operating cash flows and accruals (e.g., see Land and Lang, 2002; Lang et al, 2006; Leuz et al., 2003;
Tucker and Zarowin, 2006).
Using a sample period from1987 to 2012 and controlling for the determinants of innate accruals, as prior literature suggests
(Dechow and Dichev, 2002; Francis et al., 2004, 2005a, 2005b), we find evidence that higher UI benefits are indeed associated
with reduced income smoothing.1 Moreover, we fail to find similar results when accruals are re-estimated as ‘‘innate accruals,”
per Francis et al. (2005a, 2005b). In other words, our results suggest that the attenuation of income smoothing behavior due to UI
benefits can indeed be attributed to the exercising of accounting discretion rather than to innate factors that affect accruals.
We also conduct several cross-sectional analyses to further our understanding of the effects of UI benefits on income
smoothing. Recognizing that employees’ concerns about unemployment are a function of both UI benefits’ generosity and
the risk of being unemployed, we first investigate whether the impact of the benefits on income smoothing is affected by
the risk of unemployment. Because the value of UI benefits is especially salient when unemployment risk is high, we hypoth-
esize that the role of UI benefits in curbing income smoothing is greater when the risk of unemployment is high. We test this
idea by using the state-level prevalence of collective bargaining agreements, the industry-level fraction of workers who
receive income from UI, and the industry-level mass layoff propensity to capture unemployment risk. Unemployment risk
increases when a firm’s workforce is less likely to be covered by union-negotiated collective bargaining agreements, when
the industry-level propensity of having to access UI benefits is high, and when the likelihood of being laid off en masse is
high. Our findings are as predicted. Across all three unemployment risk proxies, we find that UI benefits have a stronger
effect in reducing income smoothing when the risk of unemployment is high.
UI benefits are especially appealing to low-wage workers because they have limited assets and savings that can provide a
liquidity cushion in the event of a layoff (Browning and Crossley, 2001; Bloemen and Stancanelli, 2005). Hence, we expect
any attenuation of income smoothing due to UI benefits to be especially pronounced for firms that employ a proportionately
large number of low-wage workers. Following Agrawal and Matsa (2013), we capture the industry-level proportion of low-
wage workers as the fraction of workers who earn less than $50,000 a year and find that our results are indeed stronger for
firms that are likely to have more low-wage workers.
Firms may engage in income smoothing behavior with either garbling or signaling objectives (e.g., see Tucker and
Zarowin, 2006). Garbling distorts and signaling improves a firm’s information environment. To gain some insight into this
issue, we carry out additional analyses to examine whether our findings vary systematically based on the level of corporate
governance, as firms with strong governance should commit to a strong information environment (e.g., Dechow et al., 1996;
Francis et al., 2005a, 2005b; Koh, 2007; Armstrong et al., 2012). Garbling (signaling) behavior suggests that the sensitivity of
income smoothing to UI benefits would be stronger for firms with weak (strong) corporate governance. We capture corpo-
rate governance in terms of the governance index (Gompers et al., 2003) and the entrenchment index (Bebchuk et al., 2008).
The results indicate that our results are stronger for firms with weak corporate governance, suggesting that unemployment
concern-driven income smoothing behavior is more likely aimed at information garbling than signaling.
In robustness tests, we construct a geographic disclosure-weighted measure of UI benefits to capture the differential
effects that UI benefits have on income smoothing in relation to a firm’s exposure in a certain state. In applying this measure,
we continue to find consistent results. We also identify periods with large increases in UI benefits and find that the results
are stronger in state-years with larger increases in UI benefits. Furthermore, we obtain robust results when we use smaller
samples in which additional state-level controls are applied or from which industries with dispersed inter-state workforces
are removed. Additional tests also reveal that our findings cannot be attributed to the temporal decline in accruals-operating
cash flow relationship reported by Bushman et al. (2016). Collectively, these findings enhance our confidence that UI benefits
affect firms’ income smoothing decisions.
Our paper contributes to the literature in several ways. First, even though the Financial Accounting Standards Board
(FASB) recognizes employees as a primary group of financial statement users, few studies investigate whether financial
reporting choices are influenced by broad labor considerations.2 In contrast, a large body of literature documents how the
1 Our empirical models also include firm and year fixed effects so that the results are not driven by time invariant firm-level factors and time trends.
2 FASB Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts No. 8, OB2 and BC1.10.
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remuneration of top executives (typically CEOs and CFOs) influences firms’ financial reporting quality (e.g., see Healy and
Wahlen, 1999; Kothari, 2001). Accordingly, our paper adds to the literature that explores how considerations of rank-and-
file employees can also affect a firm’s financial reporting outcomes (Hamm et al., 2018; Liberty and Zimmerman, 1986).
Second, the extant literature on how corporate behavior is affected by UI benefits investigates issues ranging from wage-
setting (e.g., see Abowd and Ashenfelter, 1981; Hamermesh and Wolfe, 1990; Li, 1986; Topel, 1984) to layoffs (Topel, 1983)
and corporate leverage decisions (Agrawal and Matsa, 2013). By showing that state UI benefits also affect income smoothing
behavior, we contribute to the growing literature that finds evidence of the financial reporting externalities of UI (e.g., Dou
et al., 2016; Ji and Tan, 2016). Our paper complements Dou et al. (2016), which reports evidence of firms engaging in upward
earnings management in response to unemployment concerns. We believe that our finding of unemployment concern-
driven income smoothing behavior is especially interesting because income smoothing directly relates to firm’s incentive
to project itself as less risky and therefore by extension to the notion of attempts to minimize compensating wage differen-
tials. Additionally, income smoothing is likely to be a more sustainable form of earnings management in contexts where UI
benefits may remain constant over several years and changes in UI benefits are less predictable.
Finally and more generally, our findings provide evidence of broad public policy decisions such as UI programs having a
significant, yet likely unintended, influence on corporate financial reporting outcomes. Hence, we believe our paper con-
tributes to the broader literature that investigates issues pertaining to the intersection of public policy and accounting.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section two develops the hypotheses. Section three describes the data
and empirical design. Section four presents the results and robustness tests. Section five offers conclusions.
2. Hypotheses development
In the United States, the Federal–State UI Program is an important safety net that provides temporary income to eligible
workers who are unemployed through no fault of their own.3 Based on guidelines under federal law, each state administers a
separate UI program. State laws determine the eligibility, amounts, and durations of UI benefits. Most states fund their pro-
grams through taxation on employers, with three states requiring minimal employee contributions. The taxes imposed on
the firms vary based on past experience; firms that have had more worker unemployment claims in the past pay higher taxes.4
Claims for UI benefits are paid by state governments, which are allowed to tap federal funds after they use up their resources or
if they reach certain rates of aggregate unemployment. The benefits are typically based on a percentage of an individual’s earn-
ings over the most recent 52-week period and are limited to a maximum amount stipulated by each state. Most states allow for
a maximum of 26 weeks of benefits.5
Many factors can lead to variation in UI benefits across states and times. Key factors include underlying economic con-
ditions (e.g., higher average wages) and political forces (e.g., bolstering of political support). The direct effect of the UI pro-
gram is on unemployed workers. Gruber (1997) argues that the primary advantage of UI benefits is to smooth consumption
during periods of unemployment. In particular, he argues that pooling unemployment risk through insurance leads to
greater efficiency and provides evidence that consumption would fall significantly in the absence of UI. Other studies have
found that UI is associated with workers’ search for new employment, duration of unemployment spells, labor productivity,
savings, stock market participation, and mortgage defaults (e.g., Feldstein, 1978; Topel and Welch, 1980; Moffitt, 1985; Katz
and Meyer, 1990; Meyer, 1995; Acemoglu and Shimer, 2000; Gormley et al., 2010; Engen and Gruber, 2001; Meyer and Mok,
2007; Hsu et al., 2018).
2.1. The relation between UI and income smoothing
In this paper, we argue that concerns over unemployment potentially affect managerial decisions on financial reporting,
given that both existing and prospective employees are likely to use the firm’s accounting information to assess their risk of
unemployment. As a higher risk of unemployment leads to higher compensating wage differentials, firms have incentives to
present their employment prospects in a more positive light. These compensating wage differentials can impose substantial
costs on firms. For example, employing conservative assumptions, Agrawal and Matsa (2013) estimate that in the absence of
UI benefits, the cost of compensating wage differentials is 154 basis points of firm value for a BBB-rated firm. Chemmanur
et al. (2013) find that the incremental labor costs associated with higher unemployment risk (due to added leverage) are
large enough to offset the tax-shield benefits of debt. Therefore, managers who are concerned about these costs have an
incentive to project a less risky image of the firm to current and prospective employees.
Markets perceive volatile earnings as symptomatic of higher risk. Consequently, managers exhibit a proclivity to engage
in income smoothing activities.6 For example, 97% of the senior managers surveyed by Graham et al. (2005) indicate a prefer-
ence for smooth income, and up to 78% of the participating managers indicate a willingness to sacrifice economic value to
achieve it. Moreover, 89% of the respondents express the belief that the market perceives smoother earnings as less risky. More
3 http://workforcesecurity.doleta.gov/unemploy/uifactsheet.asp.
4 See, for example, the determination of UI tax rates in Washington State: http://www.esd.wa.gov/newsandinformation/faq/tax-rate-update-6–10.php.
5 For a more detailed discussion of the institutional background of UI programs in the United States, see Agrawal and Matsa (2013).
6 Merchant and Rockness (1994) report that managers find earnings management ethically more acceptable when they believe their action is in the
organization’s best interest.
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than two-thirds of respondents indicate that smoother earnings signal business stability to customers and suppliers, potentially
resulting in better terms of trade; this suggests that perceptions of lower risk conveyed via smoother earnings likely elicit ben-
efits from a broad array of stakeholders. Consistent with this survey evidence, a large body of empirical literature reports cases
in which accruals are used to achieve smoother income (e.g., see Hall, 1993; Wahlen, 1994; Collins et al., 1995; Land and Lang,
2002; Leuz et al., 2003; Kanagaretnam et al., 2004; Lang et al., 2006; Liu and Ryan, 2006; Kilic et al., 2013).
Therefore, given the compensating wage differential costs associated with the risk of unemployment and the perception
of lower risk afforded by smoother income, we posit that managers have incentives to engage in income smoothing to mit-
igate current and potential employees’ unemployment risk concerns.
Workers’ concerns about future unemployment are partially alleviated by the presence of UI benefits programs, as these
programs provide a source of income for workers in the event of a layoff. When the expected unemployment income is
higher, there is less concern about future unemployment. If greater unemployment concerns do indeed induce more income
smoothing from managers, then such behavior should be curtailed when high UI benefits are present because UI benefits
diminish unemployment concerns and compensating wage differentials. Accordingly, we expect lower levels of income
smoothing in the presence of high UI benefits. Hence, our main hypothesis is as follows (in alternative form):
Hypothesis H1. Income smoothing is negatively associated with UI benefits.
It is worth noting that H1 is a joint hypothesis of compensating wage differential concerns inducing income smoothing
behavior and income smoothing being costly, all else constant. If income smoothing is costless, we would not expect the
propensity to do it to decline, even if the compensating wage differential concerns were to diminish due to high UI benefits.
We expect income smoothing activities to entail some costs, for several reasons. First, income smoothing could entail com-
pliance/control costs because regulators typically view discretionary income smoothing as a departure from the spirit of
GAAP. For example, banking sector regulators have expressed concern about the practice of creating cookie jar reserves of
loan loss provisions with the objective of income smoothing, and, in 2001, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
introduced the Staff Accounting Bulletin (SAB) 102 to curb this behavior and to ensure that banks consistently follow GAAP
in provisioning for loan losses (Beck and Narayanamoorthy, 2013). Second, because income smoothing requires the building
of precautionary reserves during periods of strong performance in order to release them in subsequent poor performance
periods, engaging in the practice constrains managers’ ability to report highly favorable results during periods of good per-
formance. Third, borrowing from future earnings to smooth current-period income could expose the manager to disastrous
consequences if the future performance also turns out to be unexpectedly poor (Ronen and Sadan, 1981). Given these poten-
tial costs of income smoothing, it is reasonable to posit that managers’ propensity to engage in this behavior would diminish
in line with their diminishing incentive to project a less risky image of the firm to employees.
2.2. The effect of unemployment risk
Our primary hypothesis posits firms’ propensity to engage in income smoothing to be lower when UI benefits are high
because UI benefits moderate compensating wage differentials. Clearly, there is a direct link between unemployment risk
and the usefulness of UI benefits. No income is expected from UI benefits if the layoff probability is zero. However, as unem-
ployment risk increases, so do the expected benefits of unemployment income.
A number of labor market characteristics can affect unemployment risk. For example, the propensity to lay off workers
can vary across industries due to structural factors such as the nature of demand and production technology (Agrawal and
Matsa, 2013). Further, the unemployment risk of workers in some firms and/or industries could be attenuated by contractual
arrangements such as collective bargaining agreements. If compensating wage differentials are higher when employees face
greater unemployment risk, then the impact of UI benefits in mitigating unemployment concerns should also be greater in
contexts of high unemployment risk. Hence, to the extent that income smoothing behavior is induced by workers’ unem-
ployment concerns, the role of generous UI benefits in attenuating it should be stronger for firms with workers who are
exposed to higher unemployment risk.
Therefore, we posit our second hypothesis as follows (in alternative form):
Hypothesis H2. The negative association between income smoothing and UI benefits is stronger when the risk of unemployment is
high.
2.3. The effect of employee wage profile
UI benefits provide liquidity to workers during periods of unemployment and facilitate consumption smoothing (Gruber,
1997; Chetty, 2008). These benefits are especially useful for low-wage workers because they are more likely to have limited
assets and savings that can provide a liquidity cushion during a layoff (Browning and Crossley, 2001; Bloemen and
Stancanelli, 2005; Agrawal and Matsa, 2013). Hence, if a reduction in unemployment concerns due to UI benefits moderates
firms’ income smoothing behavior, we would expect the effect to be stronger for firms that employ a proportionately large
number of low-wage workers.
Accordingly, our third hypothesis is as follows (in alternative form):
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Hypothesis H3. The negative association between income smoothing and UI benefits is stronger for firms that employ
proportionately large numbers of low-wage workers.
3. Data and empirical framework
Unlike in most other countries, the level of UI benefits in the United States is determined at the state rather than the
national level. Moreover, there are time-series variations in UI benefits at the state level. We use these cross-sectional (across
states) and time-series (within state) variations in UI benefits to test our conjecture of a link between income smoothing and
unemployment concerns.
3.1. Data
We obtain data on UI benefits from the U.S. Department of Labor’s annual issue of Significant Provisions of State Unem-
ployment Insurance Laws; data on firm financials come from Compustat.7 We combine data on firm-level financial informa-
tion with state-level UI benefits, based on the state where the firm’s headquarters is located.8 We exclude firms in the financial
services and utilities industries (SIC 6000-6999 and SIC 4900-4948). After ensuring data sufficiency to compute all of the control
variables, our unemployment insurance data range is from 1987 to 2011, and the sample used in testing our primary hypothesis
consists of 75,537 firm-year observations.9
3.2. Measurement of UI benefits
To analyze the effect of UI benefits on financial reporting, we use the maximum amount of unemployment benefits (UI)
allowed by each state in a given year. This amount is defined as the maximum number of weeks that a state provides benefits
to claimants (Max Duration), multiplied by the maximumweekly benefit amount (MaxWeekly Benefit). This variable provides
a proxy for the total UI benefits that a claimant can receive in a given year which has been shown to affect firms’ financial
policies (Agrawal and Matsa, 2013).
Panel A of Table 1 presents the means of the maximum weekly UI benefits, maximum durations, and the maximum total
UI benefits by state over our sample period. Although there is little variation in the maximum number of weeks that a worker
can claim unemployment benefits (with the average being 26 weeks across most states), the maximum amount of the mean
weekly (total) benefits varies significantly, ranging from a low of $187 ($4,870) in Mississippi to a high of $642 ($19,260) in
Massachusetts. Panel B shows the mean values of the maximumweekly benefits, the maximum durations, and the total ben-
efits for each year in our sample period.
Table 2 presents summary statistics for the variables used in the paper. The mean maximum UI benefit over our sample
period is $9,036, with the 25th and 75th percentiles being $8,759 and $9,267, respectively. We might consider these max-
imum benefits to be relatively small, at least in comparison with some workers’ salaries prior to being laid off. From a utility
(or economic importance) perspective, however, the utility for a dollar of employment income is likely to be lower than the
utility for a dollar of unemployment income because of the diminishing marginal utility of income. A key reason for this dif-
ference in utility is that dollars received from a salary are likely to be spent on discretionary items, and dollars from UI are
more likely to be spent on basic necessities. UI benefits provide an important economic lifeline to many who have lost their
jobs. It is also important to note that involuntary unemployment tends to increase sharply during periods of economic crisis,
when the wealth of many individuals falls significantly and there are fewer job opportunities in general. The marginal utility
per dollar of income (and especially unemployment income) is likely to be greater during these periods. In fact, prior studies
that document the links between UI benefits and corporate leverage (Agrawal and Matsa, 2013), or between UI and banks’
consumer credit decisions (Hsu et al., 2018), suggest that the effect of these benefits on employees is nontrivial.
3.3. Regression specification
We follow the prior literature by seeking to capture firms’ income smoothing behavior in terms of the negative correla-
tion between operating cash flows and accruals (e.g., see Land and Lang, 2002; Lang et al., 2006; Leuz et al., 2003; Tucker and
Zarowin, 2006). The intuition here is that income smoothing incentives tend to result in firms making negative accruals in
periods of strong performance (thereby creating precautionary reserves) and positive accruals in periods of weak perfor-
mance (by releasing reserves). The firm’s fundamental performance is proxied by operating cash flows. Although a negative
correlation between operating cash flows and accruals can be a natural result of accruals accounting (Dechow, 1994), the
literature recognizes that the excess correlation that remains after relevant controls are employed (which varies in a system-
7 http://workforcesecurity.doleta.gov/unemploy/statelaws.asp#sigprouilaws.
8 This matching criterion creates some measurement error with respect to the variable of interest if some of the firm’s workers are located outside of the
headquarters state, as employees are covered by the UI laws of the state in which they are employed. We address this issue in additional analyses by employing
a geographic–disclosure-weighted measure of UI and excluding industries with a dispersed workforce. We find similar results. See Section 4.4.3.
9 The sample size is larger in some specifications where the requirements for the control variables are less restrictive.
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Table 1
Panel A: Average unemployment insurance benefits by state.
State Max weekly
benefit
Max
duration
Unemployment
insurance
State Max weekly
benefit
Max
duration
Unemployment
insurance
Alabama 194 26 5,032 Montana 276 27 7,408
Alaska 319 27 8,288 Nebraska 223 26 5,794
Arizona 199 26 5,184 Nevada 281 26 7,295
Arkansas 310 26 8,068 New
Hampshire
286 26 7,443
California 304 26 7,900 New Jersey 420 26 10,925
Colorado 338 26 8,786 New Mexico 283 26 7,365
Connecticut 443 26 11,518 New York 339 26 8,808
Delaware 292 26 7,583 North Carolina 353 26 9,169
District of
Columbia
328 26 8,520 North Dakota 284 26 7,373
Florida 256 26 6,663 Ohio 385 26 10,002
Georgia 249 26 6,462 Oklahoma 280 26 7,275
Hawaii 384 26 9,988 Oregon 355 26 9,226
Idaho 277 26 7,196 Pennsylvania 413 26 10,749
Illinois 385 26 10,015 Rhode Island 479 26 12,449
Indiana 273 26 7,095 South Carolina 243 26 6,318
Iowa 322 26 8,370 South Dakota 214 26 5,565
Kansas 308 26 8,006 Tennessee 231 26 6,018
Kentucky 292 26 7,592 Texas 296 26 7,694
Louisiana 222 26 5,762 Utah 318 26 8,263
Maine 376 26 9,783 Vermont 286 26 7,431
Maryland 281 26 7,293 Virginia 264 26 6,861
Massachusetts 642 26 19,260 Washington 403 29 11,468
Michigan 315 26 8,186 West Virginia 323 26 8,396
Minnesota 395 26 10,271 Wisconsin 293 26 7,606
Mississippi 187 26 4,870 Wyoming 279 26 7,246
Missouri 224 26 5,828
Table 1
Panel B: Unemployment insurance benefits by year, 1987–2011.
Year N Max weekly benefit Max duration Max UI benefits
1987 654 187.62 26.04 4,907.21
1988 3586 194.64 26.04 5,090.42
1989 3793 203.62 26.04 5,326.34
1990 3806 214.19 26.04 5,605.13
1991 3861 222.17 26.04 5,813.32
1992 4111 233.32 26.15 6,119.32
1993 4400 242.15 26.15 6,351.85
1994 4593 251.4 26.15 6,598.72
1995 4800 257.32 26.15 6,754.26
1996 5082 264.17 26.15 6,934.15
1997 4974 272.66 26.15 7,157.70
1998 4604 280.23 26.15 7,358.11
1999 4426 291.26 26.15 7,647.06
2000 4279 299.47 26.15 7,863.55
2001 3992 322.77 26.15 8,479.36
2002 3697 336.23 26.15 8,837.28
2003 3554 347.85 26.15 9,138.87
2004 3493 357.62 26.15 9,393.13
2005 3379 365.64 26.11 9,578.04
2006 3271 376.02 26.11 9,848.26
2007 3201 388 26.11 10,166.72
2008 3064 404.81 26.11 10,607.58
2009 2902 420.17 26.11 11,010.87
2010 2825 427.55 26.11 11,203.32
2011 2722 428.58 26.11 11,229.81
Panel A (B) shows the distribution of unemployment insurance allowed by state (year). UI is the average of the maximum unemployment benefit allowed,
defined as the product of the maximum weekly benefit times the maximum number of weeks allowed.
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atic manner, as predicted by earnings management incentives) reflects income smoothing behavior.10 This approach allows
us to capture income smoothing propensities in an intuitive manner, without having to use multiple years of observations to
capture income and cash flow volatility.11 Using a multiple-year approach to capture income smoothing is problematic in
our setting because UI benefits could undergo several changes within a given multi-year time frame.
Following the prior literature (e.g., Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney, 1995; Sloan, 1996), we measure accruals as follows:
Accruals = (DCA – DCash) – (DCL – DSTD – DTP) – Dep, where DCA = the change in current assets, DCash = the change in
cash/cash equivalents, DCL = the change in current liabilities, DSTD = the change in debt included in current liabilities,
DTP = the change in income taxes payable, and Dep = depreciation and amortization expense. Having computed accruals,
we then define the following variables:
Accruals ¼ accruals=average total assets: ð1Þ
CFO ¼ income from continuing operations - accrualsð Þ=average total assets: ð2Þ
CFO is cash flow from operations, and average total assets is the average of the beginning and ending book value of total
assets. Following the prior literature, a basic model of income smoothing can be depicted as
Accruals ¼ b0 þ b1CFOt þ bnControlst þ e: ð3Þ
Controls represents the vector of variables that attempt to capture the determinants of innate (i.e., nondiscretionary)
accruals. In controlling for innate factors that determine accruals, following Jones (1991) and many subsequent papers
(e.g., Dechow et al., 1995), we control for the change in revenue (DRevenuet) and gross plant, property, and equipment
(PP&Et) scaled by average total assets. As the next set of determinants of innate accruals, we follow Dechow and Dichev
(2002) and Francis et al. (2004, 2005a) and control for firm size, cash flow variability, sales variability, length of operating
cycle, incidence of negative earnings realizations, intangibles intensity, and capital intensity. Firm size is proxied by the
log of total assets (Log_Assetst). Cash flow variability (r(CFO)t) and sales variability (r(Sales)t) are measured as the standard
deviation of the firm’s rolling 10-year cash flows from operations and sales revenue respectively, with both scaled by total
assets. Operating cycle (OperCyclet) is the log of the sum of days accounts receivable and days inventory. The incidence of
negative earnings (NegEarnt) is the proportion of losses over the prior 10 years. Intangibles intensity (Int_Intensityt) is the
sum of R&D and advertising expenses as a fraction of sales revenue. Capital intensity (Cap_Intensityt) is captured as the ratio
of the net book value of property, plant, and equipment to total assets. We also control for state-level GDP growth
(GDP_Growtht) to control for the possibility of macroeconomic growth affecting the firm’s accruals.
Table 2
Summary statistics.
Mean Standard deviation 25th percentile Median 75 percentile
Accrualst 0.044 0.105 0.086 0.040 0.002
CFOt 0.003 0.243 0.036 0.059 0.120
UIt-1 9.036 0.362 8.759 8.991 9.267
CFOt-1 0.009 0.224 0.025 0.062 0.123
CFOt+1 0.006 0.232 0.024 0.063 0.122
DRevenuet 0.094 0.311 0.020 0.067 0.207
PP&Et 0.551 0.406 0.230 0.451 0.792
Log_Assetst 5.167 2.177 3.603 5.063 6.642
@(CFO) t 0.190 0.417 0.042 0.077 0.151
@(Sales) t 0.506 0.622 0.161 0.306 0.583
OperCyclet 4.642 0.760 4.234 4.707 5.124
NegEarnt 0.335 0.348 0.000 0.200 0.600
Int_Intensityt 0.192 0.715 0.000 0.015 0.086
Cap_Intensityt 0.288 0.238 0.096 0.214 0.423
GDP_Growtht 5.120 2.704 3.660 5.220 6.980
This table presents the summary statistics for the variables used in the paper. Accruals is total accruals divided by total assets. CFO is cash flow from
operations divided by total assets. UI is the maximum unemployment benefit allowed, defined as the product of the maximum weekly benefits times the
maximum number of weeks allowed expressed in thousands of dollars. Regression models employ the natural log of UI. DRevenue is the change in sales
divided by total assets. PP&E is property, plant, and equipment divided by total assets. Log_Assets is the natural log of total assets. r(CFO) is the standard
deviation of the rolling ten-year cash flows from operations scaled by total assets. r(Sales) is the standard deviation of sales revenue scaled by total assets.
OperCycle is the log of the sum of days accounts receivable and days inventory. NegEarn is the proportion of losses over the prior ten years. Int_Intensity is
the sum of R&D and advertising expense as a fraction of sales revenue. Cap_Intensity is the ratio of net book value of property, plant, and equipment to total
assets. GDP_Growth is state-level growth in GDP.
10 This approach of capturing income smoothing is also prevalent in the banking literature, where the propensity for smoothing is measured in terms of the
correlation between income before provisions (equivalent to operating cash flow for banks) and loan loss provisions (which are the largest form of accrual for
banks) (e.g., see Wahlen, 1994; Collins et al., 1995; Kanagaretnam et al., 2004; Liu and Ryan, 2006; Kilic et al., 2013).
11 For example, studies such as those by Leuz et al. (2003), Francis et al. (2004), and Lang et al. (2012) capture income smoothing as the ratio of the standard
deviation of income to the standard deviation of operating cash flows.
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In addition to the aforementioned innate factors, we also control for CFOt-1 and CFOt+1 as a means of accounting for the
mapping of current accruals into last-period and next-period cash flows. Controlling for these cash flows (which are corre-
lated to contemporaneous cash flows) is potentially important because our paper focuses on how the accruals are condi-
tional on contemporaneous cash flows. All of our regression models also include firm and year fixed effects to control for
time-invariant firm-level effects and general time trends in the accruals process, if any.12 Finally, we cluster standard errors
by state to correct for potential correlations among firms within the same state.13
In Eq. (3), the coefficient on CFOt, b1, represents the extent to which accruals are discretionally used to smooth earnings,
conditional on cash flows from operations in the absence of any UI benefits. Note that by construction, CFO is income from
continuing operations before accruals, and thus this variable can be considered a proxy of the earnings signal prior to the use
of accruals to smooth income.
To examine the relation between UI benefits and income smoothing, we extend Eq. (3) as follows:
Accruals ¼ b0 þ b1CFOt  UIt1 þ b2CFOt þ b3UIt1 þ bnControlst þ e: ð4Þ
Following Agrawal and Matsa (2013), the model introduces UI as the natural log of the maximum unemployment benefits
allowed by a state in a given year. UI is included in the specification as a lagged variable because we argue that changes in UI
lead to changes in income smoothing behavior. Our coefficient of interest is the coefficient on the interaction term CFOt  UIt-
1 (b1). If, as hypothesized in H1, UI benefits indeed alleviate firms’ income smoothing behavior, then we expect this interac-
tion coefficient to be significantly positive. We examine H2 and H3 through subsample analyses by re-estimating regression
model (4) after splitting the sample based on the appropriate partitioning variables.
4. Results
4.1. Test of H1: relationship between UI benefits and income smoothing
Table 3 presents the results for the tests of our main hypothesis that income smoothing is negatively associated with the
level of state-level UI benefits. In Panel A of Table 3, Columns (1) and (2) report the results with and without controls for
innate accruals, respectively. Following Francis et al. (2004), Column (1) can be interpreted as the relationship between
UI benefits and income smoothing behavior exhibited by total (i.e., both innate and discretionary) accruals, while Column
(2) represents the relationship between UI benefits and income smoothing via discretionary accruals. In both columns of
Table 3, Panel A, the coefficient on CFOt is reliably negative, which is suggestive of income smoothing behavior as reported
in the prior literature. More importantly, the coefficient on the interaction term CFOt  UIt-1, which is our coefficient of inter-
est, is positive and significant. This finding suggests that, as hypothesized in H1, UI benefits reduce firms’ propensity to
engage in income smoothing activities. The impact is also economically significant. Given the magnitude of the main income
smoothing coefficient in Column 2 of Table 3 (CFOt), our results suggest a one standard deviation increase in the log of UI
benefits attenuates the income smoothing propensity by about 2.9%.14
In H1, we argue that the discretionary use of accruals for income smoothing attenuates when UI benefits are high. While
the results reported in Column (2) of Table 3, Panel A provide support for this idea, to gain further confidence in our findings,
we also examine whether similar findings can be obtained with respect to innate accruals where we do not conjecture such a
systematic relationship. If similar results are found with respect to innate accruals as well, there would be a concern that our
findings may be attributed to a factor other than the conjectured mechanism. We investigate this issue by following Francis
et al. (2005a, 2005b). Specifically, we first define innate accruals as the fitted value of annual estimations obtained by
regressing total accruals on the aforementioned determinants of innate accruals. We then regress these innate components
of accruals on CFOt, UIt-1, and CFOt  UIt-1 along with prior-year and following-year cash flows from operations. These find-
ings are reported in Panel B of Table 3. Unlike in Panel A, the coefficient on the interaction term CFOt  UIt-1 is not statistically
significant in Panel B of Table 3. In other words, we do not observe UI benefits affecting the relationship between operating
cash flows and innate accruals in a predictable manner.
Together, the results reported in Panels A and B of Table 3 provide strong support for H1 by indicating not only that the
use of accruals for income smoothing declines when UI benefits are high but also that this effect is attributable to discre-
tionary, and not innate, accruals.
4.2. Test of H2: the effect of unemployment risk
Hypothesis H2 predicts that the effect of UI benefits on reducing income smoothing should be stronger when employees
face a greater risk of unemployment. In investigating H2, we focus on labor market characteristics and use three proxies of
unemployment risk.
12 Note that year fixed effects effectively capture country-level macroeconomic factors, which are the same for all firms within a year.
13 Agrawal and Matsa (2013) argue that it is more appropriate to cluster at the state level, because that is where the variation in UI benefits occurs, and
clustering in this way controls for potential time-varying correlations in unobserved factors that affect different firms within the same state. These authors also
argue that this kind of clustering corrects for within-firm error term correlations over time, making it more generalizable than firm-level clustering.
14 (0.082  0.362) / 1.020 = 0.029.
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Certain institutional arrangements between firms and employees, such as collective bargaining agreements, are designed
to reduce employees’ unemployment risk exposure. Collective bargaining agreements are prevalent in highly unionized set-
tings and cover a wide range of employment-related issues, such as life and health insurance, pay, hours, holidays, employee
dismissal, and severance pay (e.g., see Booth, 1995). It is widely understood that it is more difficult and/or costly to lay off
employees who are covered by collective bargaining agreements. Abraham and Medoff (1984) find that written rules to deal
with permanent layoffs are present in 92% of unionized firms but only 24% of nonunionized firms.15 These written rules are
typically incorporated into collective bargaining agreements. Moreover, Budd and McCall (1997, 2004) find that unionization
significantly increases the likelihood of a low-level worker receiving UI benefits because unions act as an important information
conduit regarding the UI benefit system. Hence, both the risk and the cost of unemployment should be lower for unionized
employees who are covered by collective bargaining agreements. Therefore, we use the percentage of employees covered by
collective bargaining power agreements as our first empirical proxy of unemployment risk. Although this construct should ide-
ally be measured at the firm level, data limitations prevent us from doing so. Therefore, we measure this construct at the state-
year level using data from the Unionstats database maintained by Barry T. Hirsch and David A. Macpherson.16
Our second measure of unemployment risk is the industry-level fraction of workers who receive income from UI (UI pay-
ment rate), according to the Current Population Survey of the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). The third measure of
unemployment risk is the industry-level average annual fraction of workers separated fromwork during a mass layoff (layoff
propensity) based on data from the BLS Mass Layoff Statistics and the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis.17 High UI payment
rates and layoff propensity indicate a high risk of unemployment.
Table 3
Panel A: Impact of unemployment insurance on income smoothing via discretionary accruals.
(1) (2)
Accrualst Accrualst
CFOt  UIt-1 0.249*** 0.082***
(0.029) (0.027)
CFOt 2.551*** 1.020***
(0.270) (0.266)
UIt-1 0.018** 0.003
(0.007) (0.004)
CFOt-1 0.121*** 0.130***
(0.005) (0.007)
CFOt+1 0.114*** 0.091***
(0.003) (0.004)
DRevenuet 0.113***
(0.006)
PP&Et 0.012**
(0.006)
Log_Assetst 0.011***
(0.001)
@(CFO)t 0.006*
(0.003)
@(Sales)t 0.002
(0.002)
OperCyclet 0.010***
(0.002)
NegEarnt 0.014***
(0.003)
Int_Intensityt 0.018***
(0.002)
Cap_Intensityt 0.113***
(0.014)
GDP_Growtht 0.000
(0.000)
Firm and year fixed effects included
Observations 128,704 75,537
R-squared 0.447 0.487
15 In a related point, Gibbons and Katz (1991) argue that it is easier for employees of unionized firms to find re-employment in the event of a layoff. The
rationale is that in nonunionized settings, where firms have more discretion about whom to lay off, the market infers that laid-off workers are people of lower
ability. However, such inferences cannot be made in unionized settings, as most jobs covered by collective bargaining agreements are governed by layoff-by-
seniority rules.
16 http://unionstats.gsu.edu/.
17 We thank Professor David Matsa for providing us with data on UI payment rates and layoff propensity.
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We test H2 by running regression model (4) after separating our observations into subsamples based on high and low
propensity to hold collective bargaining agreements, UI payment rates, and layoff propensity, respectively. The high versus
low subsamples are based on cross-sectional medians of the respective measures. H2 predicts that the coefficient on the
interaction term CFOt  UIt-1 is more strongly positive (i.e., a greater propensity that UI benefits attenuate income smoothing
behavior) when the likelihood of having collective bargaining agreements is low, UI payment rates are high, and the layoff
propensity is high.
The results of H2 are presented in Table 4. Columns 1–2 report results based on the likelihood of having collective bar-
gaining agreements, while Columns 3–4 and 5–6 report results based on UI payment rates and layoff propensity, respec-
tively. As can be seen in Columns 1 and 2 of Table 4, the coefficient of interest—that on the two-way interaction term
CFOt  Riskt—is significantly positive when the likelihood of having collective bargaining agreements is low but not when
it is high. In Columns 3 and 4 of Table 4, we observe the coefficient on CFOt  Riskt to be positive and significant both when
UI payment rates are high and low. Casual observation indicates the statistical significance and the magnitude of this coef-
ficient to be smaller when UI payment rates are low (Column 4) than when they are high (Column 3). However, a chi-squared
test reveals that the coefficients on CFOt  Riskt reported in the two columns are not statistically distinguishable from one
another.18 Finally, in Column 5 of Table 4, we find the coefficient on CFOt  Riskt to be reliably positive when the layoff propen-
sity is high, but, as can be seen in Column 6 of Table 4, this coefficient remains insignificant when the layoff propensity is low.
In summary, the results reported in Table 4 are broadly supportive of H2, that the negative association between income
smoothing and UI benefits is stronger (weaker) when the risk of unemployment is high (low).
4.3. Test of H3: The effect of employee wage profile
Our final hypothesis (H3) argues that the negative association between income smoothing and UI benefits should be
stronger for firms employing proportionately large numbers of low-wage workers. Because these workers find UI benefits
most useful, the total compensation wage differentials associated with unemployment risk would be higher for firms that
employ them.
We follow Agrawal and Matsa (2013) and capture the firm’s likelihood of having a proportionately large number of low-
wage workers in terms of the industry-level percentage of workers who earn less than $50,000 in annual income based on
the 2000 U.S. population census.19 We then re-run regression model (4) after partitioning our sample into firms employing
high and low fractions of low-wage workers based on the cross-sectional median. H3 predicts a more strongly positive coeffi-
cient on the interaction term CFOt  UIt-1 for firms likely to employ a larger fraction of low-wage workers.
The results for H3 are reported in Table 5. As expected, we find the coefficient of interest—that on CFOt  UIt-1—to be reli-
ably positive for the subsample of firms with more low-wage workers (Column 1 of Table 5). In contrast, this coefficient is
Table 3
Panel B: Impact of unemployment insurance on income smoothing via innate accruals.
(1)
InnateAccrualst
CFOtUIt-1 0.013
(0.009)
CFOt 0.111
(0.081)
UIt-1 0.006**
(0.003)
CFOt-1 0.010***
(0.001)
CFOt+1 0.017***
(0.001)
Firm and year fixed effects included
Observations 75,537
R-squared 0.504
Bold coefficients are the coefficients of interest.
This table presents regression results on income smoothing. Panel A (B) reports results
using total (innate) accruals. Accruals is total accruals in t. InnateAccruals is the fitted
value from regressing Accruals on innate firm characteristics. UIt-1 is maximum total
benefits in t-1. CFOt is cash flow from operations in t. CFOt-1 is cash flow from operations
in t1. CFOt+1 is cash flow from operations in t + 1. See Table 2 for all other variable
definitions. We include firm and year fixed effects. We report coefficient estimates and
standard errors (in parentheses) based on robust standard errors clustered by state. *, **,
and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels (two-tailed),
respectively.
18 p-value = 0.347.
19 We thank Professor David Matsa for providing us with this data.
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statistically insignificant for firms with fewer low-wage workers (Column 2 of Table 5). Hence, the results reported in Table 5
support H3 in that the role of UI benefits in attenuating income smoothing behavior is stronger for firms that employ pro-
portionately large numbers of low-wage workers.
4.4. Additional analyses
4.4.1. The effect of corporate governance
The literature posits that managers may engage in income smoothing behavior either to garble information and depict a
false sense of stability or to signal their private information to external stakeholders (e.g., Tucker and Zarowin, 2006). While
garbling adversely affects a firm’s information environment, one could argue that signaling has the opposite effect.
We investigate whether the association between income smoothing and UI benefits is affected by the firm’s corporate
governance environment to gain some insight into whether unemployment concern-driven income smoothing behavior
can be primarily attributed to garbling or signaling. Prior literature suggests that stronger governance mechanisms are asso-
ciated with more transparent information environments in general and more informative earnings in particular (e.g.,
Dechow et al., 1996; Francis et al., 2005a, 2005b; Koh, 2007; Armstrong et al., 2012). Hence, if unemployment concern-
driven income smoothing behavior is primarily aimed at garbling, we would expect this behavior’s sensitivity to UI benefits
to be greater for firms with weak corporate governance. In contrast, the opposite would be expected if the main objective of
unemployment risk-driven income smoothing behavior is to improve the information environment.
We investigate this issue by re-estimating model (4) after partitioning our sample based on two commonly used proxies
of corporate governance. Our first governance proxy is the governance index (G-index) introduced by Gompers et al. (2003).
Table 4
The role of unemployment risk.
Low likelihood of collective
bargaining agreements
High likelihood of collective
bargaining agreements
High UI
payment
rates
Low UI
payment
rates
High layoff
propensity
Low layoff
propensity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Accrualst Accrualst Accrualst Accrualst Accrualst Accrualst
CFOt  UIt-1 0.173*** 0.069 0.096*** 0.075* 0.126*** 0.044
(0.038) (0.041) (0.026) (0.040) (0.026) (0.037)
CFOt 1.830*** 0.908** 1.172*** 0.942** 1.458*** 0.635*
(0.333) (0.408) (0.236) (0.385) (0.242) (0.348)
UIt-1 0.010 0.008* 0.002 0.008 0.006 0.013
(0.009) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.004) (0.008)
CFOt-1 0.118*** 0.135*** 0.138*** 0.121*** 0.147*** 0.109***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.007) (0.009) (0.007) (0.007)
CFOt+1 0.086*** 0.093*** 0.096*** 0.084*** 0.095*** 0.083***
(0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005)
DRevenuet 0.098*** 0.122*** 0.108*** 0.115*** 0.117*** 0.105***
(0.006) (0.005) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007)
PP&Et 0.012 0.011** 0.010 0.012* 0.009 0.013*
(0.011) (0.004) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007)
Log_Assetst 0.013*** 0.010*** 0.011*** 0.012*** 0.011*** 0.011***
(0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
@(CFO)t 0.006 0.005 0.003 0.009** 0.006 0.008
(0.007) (0.003) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
@(Sales)t 0.004 0.001 0.002 0.003 0.001 0.005*
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
OperCyclet 0.011*** 0.010*** 0.014*** 0.006*** 0.017*** 0.004**
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
NegEarnt 0.016*** 0.012*** 0.016*** 0.012** 0.010*** 0.021***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.003) (0.006)
Int_Intensityt 0.030*** 0.016*** 0.024*** 0.016*** 0.027*** 0.014***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
Cap_Intensityt 0.095*** 0.129*** 0.092*** 0.157*** 0.101*** 0.149***
(0.022) (0.012) (0.016) (0.012) (0.015) (0.016)
GDP_Growtht 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Firm and Year Fixed Effects Included
Observations 26,347 49,190 41,915 33,622 50,373 25,164
R-squared 0.521 0.474 0.530 0.469 0.542 0.446
Bold coefficients are the coefficients of interest.
This table presents regression results on income smoothing and unemployment risk. Unemployment risk is captured in terms of the likelihood of employees
being covered by collective bargaining agreements, industry-level UI payment rates and the industry-level layoff probability. CFOt is cash flow from
operations in t. CFOt-1 is cash flow from operations in t1. CFOt+1 is cash flow from operations in t + 1. We include firm and year fixed effects. See Table 2 for
all other variable definitions. We report coefficient estimates and standard errors (in parentheses) based on robust standard errors clustered by state. *, **,
and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels (two-tailed), respectively.
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G-index is a measure of shareholder rights based on 24 corporate governance-related provisions, with higher values indicat-
ing weaker shareholder rights. The second measure of governance is the entrenchment index (E-index), based on a subset of
six provisions included in the G-Index, which Bebchuk et al. (2008) find to be particularly useful in explaining firm value. As
with the G-index, higher E-index values indicate weaker corporate governance.
These results are reported in Table 6, with Columns 1 and 2 reporting the results for high and low G-index firms and Col-
umns 3 and 4 reporting the results for high and low E-index firms. We find that the coefficient on the interaction term CFOt -
 UIt-1 is positive and significant for firms with a high G-index (Column 1) but insignificant for low G-index firms (Column 2).
While this coefficient is statistically significant for both high and low E-index firms, we find it to be larger in magnitude for
the former (Column 3) when compared with low E-index firms (Column 4). In other words, the results reported in Table 6
suggest that firms with weaker governance are more sensitive to UI benefits in terms of their income smoothing behavior.
To the extent that weaker governance is associated with a higher likelihood of information garbling, these results indicate
that unemployment concern-driven income smoothing behavior is primarily aimed at garbling rather than signaling.
Nonetheless, these results must be viewed with caution because firms might resort to either type of income smoothing
depending on the specific temporal circumstances and because corporate governance and financial reporting attributes
are likely endogenously determined (Armstrong et al., 2010; Beyer et al., 2010).
4.4.2. The effect of the Sarbanes-Oxley act
As an additional test, we also examine whether regulatory attempts to improve governance affect our findings in the con-
text of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX). SOX sought to improve firms’ governance environment and financial reporting
quality through a number of provisions aimed at holding the CEO and CFO personally responsible for the accuracy and
completeness of financial statements and improving internal controls and auditor independence. To examine whether
Table 5
The role of the employee wage profile.
More low-wage workers Fewer low-wage workers
(1) (2)
Accrualst Accrualst
CFOt  UIt-1 0.092*** 0.070
(0.024) (0.043)
CFOt 1.130*** 0.880**
(0.233) (0.411)
UIt-1 0.005 0.001
(0.004) (0.006)
CFOt-1 0.137*** 0.114***
(0.007) (0.012)
CFOt+1 0.089*** 0.091***
(0.005) (0.006)
DRevenuet 0.115*** 0.105***
(0.007) (0.007)
PP&Et 0.011 0.017**
(0.007) (0.006)
Log_Assetst 0.015*** 0.006***
(0.002) (0.001)
@(CFO)t 0.002 0.017***
(0.005) (0.005)
@(Sales)t 0.002 0.003
(0.002) (0.002)
OperCyclet 0.009*** 0.013***
(0.001) (0.004)
NegEarnt 0.019*** 0.004
(0.002) (0.008)
Int_Intensityt 0.020*** 0.018***
(0.003) (0.005)
Cap_Intensityt 0.107*** 0.129***
(0.013) (0.020)
GDP_Growtht 0.000 0.001*
(0.000) (0.000)
Firm and year fixed effects included
Observations 50,496 25,041
R-squared 0.513 0.465
Bold coefficients are the coefficients of interest.
This table presents regression results on income smoothing and the industry-level proportion of low-wage workers in
the workforce. CFOt is cash flow from operations in t. CFOt-1 is cash flow from operations in t1. CFOt+1 is cash flow
from operations in t + 1. We include firm and year fixed effects. See Table 2 for all other variable definitions. We report
coefficient estimates and standard errors (in parentheses) based on robust standard errors clustered by state. *, **, and
*** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels (two-tailed), respectively.
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unemployment concern-driven income smoothing behavior dissipates post-SOX, we re-examine regression model (4) by
partitioning the sample into pre- and post-SOX periods. In untabulated results, we fail to find consistent evidence that
the passage of SOX has a significant impact on the relationship between UI benefits and income smoothing behavior.
4.4.3. Weighted UI based on geographic disclosure
As described in Section 3.1, we assign firms to states based on the location of their headquarters. This criterion creates
measurement error if many of a firm’s workers are located outside the headquarters state. To mitigate this concern, we
examine whether our results are robust to a geographic disclosure-weighted UI measure, which takes into account the firm’s
geographic segments by state and (presumably) the proportion of employees located in the state. Following Garcia and Norli
(2012), we define the state-level geographic dispersion of a firm’s operations as the number of different operating states
mentioned in its 10-K filings. Garcia and Norli (2012) argue that ‘‘the 10-K statement also gives information on the firm’s
properties, such as factories, warehouses and sales offices. For example, firms may include sales at stores in different states,
and/or list the manufacturing facilities they operate together with the city and state where they are located.”20 We obtain our
relative state counts for each state (counts of one state/counts of total states) for each firm from Garcia and Norli (2012) and use
it to compute a geographic disclosure-weighted average UI measure (GDW-UIt-1). In this measure, state-level UI benefits are
weighted by the relative state counts obtained from the 10-K disclosures. While the availability of the GDW-UIt-1 measure
results in a sample attrition of nearly 60%, in untabulated analyses we continue to find that higher UI benefits lead to less
income smoothing when we re-run model (4) after replacing UIt-1 with GDW-UIt-1 (i.e., we find the coefficient on the interaction
term CFOt  GDW-UIt-1 to be positive and significant).
Table 6
The role of corporate governance.
High G-Index Low G-Index High E-Index Low E-Index
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Accrualst Accrualst Accrualst Accrualst
CFOt  UIt-1 0.247*** 0.094 0.197*** 0.108**
(0.049) (0.057) (0.042) (0.052)
CFOt 2.632*** 1.146** 2.134*** 1.281**
(0.476) (0.559) (0.412) (0.513)
UIt-1 0.024*** 0.010 0.016** 0.015*
(0.006) (0.008) (0.006) (0.008)
CFOt-1 0.119*** 0.128*** 0.121*** 0.127***
(0.021) (0.011) (0.013) (0.015)
CFOt+1 0.069*** 0.084*** 0.060*** 0.098***
(0.012) (0.020) (0.009) (0.025)
DRevenuet 0.087*** 0.096*** 0.085*** 0.098***
(0.006) (0.009) (0.005) (0.009)
PP&Et 0.008 0.007 0.009 0.016**
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.006)
Log_Assetst 0.005** 0.004 0.008*** 0.003
(0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002)
@(CFO) 0.006 0.004 0.014 0.005
(0.023) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010)
@(Sales) 0.001 0.003 0.000 0.004
(0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.004)
OperCycle 0.006 0.012*** 0.008*** 0.008***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
NegEarn 0.021*** 0.025** 0.020** 0.023***
(0.006) (0.011) (0.007) (0.009)
Int_Intensity 0.021*** 0.025*** 0.026*** 0.026***
(0.007) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Cap_Intensity 0.049*** 0.099*** 0.060*** 0.081***
(0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016)
GDP_Growtht 0.000 0.001*** 0.000 0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Firm and Year Fixed Effects Included
Observations 9,795 13,658 14,612 13,370
R-squared 0.553 0.520 0.562 0.534
Bold coefficients are the coefficients of interest.
This table presents regression results on income smoothing and corporate governance. Corporate governance is captured in terms of the Governance index
(G-index) and the Entrenchment index (E-index). Accruals is total accruals in t. UIt-1 is maximum total benefits in t1. CFOt is cash flow from operations in t.
CFOt-1 is cash flow from operations in t1. CFOt+1 is cash flow from operations in t + 1. We include firm and year fixed effects. See Table 2 for all other
variable definitions. We report coefficient estimates and standard errors (in parentheses) based on robust standard errors clustered by state. *, **, and ***
indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels (two-tailed), respectively.
20 As Garcia and Norli (2012) explain, the counted number of states is comprised of the occurrence of different state names in the following 10-K sections:
Item 1: Business, Item 2: Properties, Item 6: Consolidated Financial Data, and Item 7: Management’s Discussion and Analysis.
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Although our findings on the relationship between UI and income smoothing continue to hold with the GDW-UIt-1 mea-
sure, it is worth noting that we cannot identify the context in which each state is mentioned in the 10-K filings. The filings
are most likely to mention states where the firm’s operations have a substantial presence, where new operations have begun,
or where firms have recently ceased operations. As such, we choose to follow prior studies and use the headquarters-based
measure as our primary measure of UI. To further alleviate concerns about the measurement error regarding UI, we follow
Agrawal andMatsa (2013) by carrying out an additional robustness test in which we exclude industries characterized as hav-
ing dispersed workforces. Agrawal and Matsa (2013) identify retail, wholesale, and transportation as industries with more
dispersed workforces. Untabulated results show that our results are not sensitive to this exclusion.
4.4.4. Effects of large increases in UI
Although our cross-sectional tests enhance our confidence that our main results are driven by changes in UI benefits, we
adopt another identification strategy by focusing on periods in which states experience large shocks to their UI benefits. Fol-
lowing Dou et al. (2016), we identify state-years in which UI benefits increase by more than 10% and examine whether our
results are stronger for these periods. We separate our main sample into subsamples of firm-years with and without large UI
increases and then re-estimate model (4) separately for these two subsamples. Untabulated results indicate that although
we continue to find a positive coefficient on the interaction term CFOt  UIt-1 in both subsamples, the magnitude of this coef-
ficient is over 70% larger for the subsample of firm-years in which there are large increases in UI benefits. This finding pro-
vides further evidence of a causal relation between UI benefits and income smoothing behavior.
4.4.5. Controls for other state-level factors
Our primary analyses control for state-level GDP growth. In untabulated analyses, we apply additional state-level con-
trols: the state unemployment rate and the percentage of the state population claiming unemployment benefits. While
the use of these controls leads to smaller sample sizes, we continue to find results that support all of our hypotheses.
4.4.6. Controlling for temporal decline in accruals-operating cash flow relationship
In a recent paper, Bushman et al. (2016) report a temporal decline in the negative correlation between accruals and oper-
ating cash flows and find that this attenuation can largely be attributed to the increased incidences of one-time and nonop-
erating items and frequency of loss firm-years. This is relevant to our paper because, given the upward trend exhibited by
unemployment benefits notwithstanding the use of year fixed effects, it is possible that the interaction coefficient CFOt  UIt-
1 is simply picking up the time trend uncovered by Bushman et al. (2016). To rule out this alternative explanation, in unt-
abulated tests, we re-run our regression model (4) after including additional controls for special items (Compustat item SPI)
and nonoperating items (Compustat item NOPI), both scaled by average net assets. Note that our model already controls for
the incidence of loss making. We find that the inclusion of these additional control variables does not alter our inferences, as
we continue to find positive and significant coefficients on the interaction term CFOt  UIt-1 (p-value < 0.01). As a further test,
we re-run our analyses after removing firms with special items, firms with above-median nonoperating items, and loss firms.
If the positive coefficient on CFOt  UIt-1 can largely be attributed to factors that contribute to temporal attenuation of the
accruals-operating cash flow relationship, then these exclusions should bias against our results. However, untabulated
results reveal that our inferences are not sensitive to these exclusions.
5. Conclusion
Labor theory on compensating wage differentials suggests that managers have incentives to smooth income to project a
less risky image of the firm to employees because lower unemployment risk has the ex-ante effect of lowering the cost of
compensating workers. If so, state UI benefits, which mitigate unemployment concerns, should curtail managerial incentives
to engage in income smoothing. Using exogenous inter-state cross-sectional and intra-state time-series variations in U.S. UI
benefits, we show that more generous state UI benefits result in less income smoothing by firms. This effect of UI benefits is
interesting because it is likely an unintended outcome of state-level labor policies. It is difficult to imagine policy makers, in
deliberating UI policies, explicitly considering the firm-level financial reporting implications of their decisions (which could
have additional consequences, such as a lower cost of capital or higher financial reporting quality).
To deepen our insight into the effect of UI benefits on income smoothing, we show that the effect is stronger when work-
ers face higher unemployment risk and when the firm is likely to employ proportionately more low-wage workers, who find
UI benefits especially useful. In additional tests, we find this effect to be stronger for firms with weak corporate governance,
but we do not find the passage of SOX to have had a significant impact on this behavior.
Reverse causality and endogeneity are important concerns that preclude the researcher from making strong causal infer-
ences in empirical studies of financial economics. Although our paper is not completely devoid of these concerns, we believe
that our institutional setting and research design choices allay them to a great extent.
First, as we capture UI benefits at the state level, it is unlikely that reverse causality explains our results because it is dif-
ficult to imagine a situation where state-level UI benefits are affected by firm-level income smoothing.
Second, while it is conceptually plausible to conceive of broader economic factors that affect both UI benefits and firms’
income smoothing behavior, thereby raising concerns about omitted correlated variables, from a practical standpoint, it
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appears that changes in UI benefits are driven by political considerations more than the underlying economics. For example,
in the state of Florida, the maximum UI benefits remained constant over the 1998–2011 period, despite notable fluctuations
in the economy. Meanwhile, Connecticut and Massachusetts increased their UI benefits almost annually during the same
period. Lending support to this emphasis on political considerations, Agrawal and Matsa (2013) report that unlike the pat-
terns of broader economic indicators, there are no regional trends in UI benefits. Moreover, in all of our analyses, we control
for GDP growth rates to capture statewide economic conditions, and we include year fixed effects to control for broad time-
series trends. As we employ firm fixed effects in all of our tests, results are also unlikely to be driven by time-invariant, omit-
ted firm-level factors.
Third, we obtain the expected results from all of our cross-sectional tests that examine the conditions under which the
relation between income smoothing and UI benefits are likely to be more/less pronounced. These results lend further sup-
port to a causal relation.
How a firm’s financial reporting is shaped by broader public policy decisions is an important issue because accounting
decisions are invariably influenced by the broader environment in which the firm operates. Even so, empirical evidence
regarding this issue is rarely examined in the corporate disclosure literature. Seen in this light, we believe this paper to
be of interest to a wide array of audiences. Although our paper indicates a link between UI benefits and accruals-based finan-
cial reporting decisions, it is plausible that UI benefits also influence earnings management decisions through real actions
(i.e., real earnings management). We leave the exploration of this issue to future research.
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